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REFLECTIONS ON PROPOSALS FOR CORPORATE
REFORM THROUGH CHANGE IN THE
COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
"SPECIAL INTEREST" OR "PUBLIC" DIRECTORSt
PHILLIP

I.

BLUMBERG*

This paper is concerned with proposals for corporate reform through
change in the composition of the board of directors by the inclusion of
"special interest" or "public" directors. Such proposals have become an
increasingly frequent topic for intellectual inquiry in the United States and
have been the subject of shareholder proposals in a number of so-called
"public interest proxy contests."
I. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SUCH PROPOSALS

The proposals for broadening the composition of the board of directors
reflect a series of factors.
A. Corporate Power
Primarily, they reflect a recognition of the large public corporation as a
political and social institution of paramount dimensions in a society in
crisis. Recognition of the power and role of the major corporation in the
American society inevitably leads to evaluation and review of its structure
for governance.
B.

The Social and Environmental Crisis

It is almost platitudinous to note that we are living in a world undergoing
profound and accelerating change-change in attitudes and values, as well
as change in institutions. Further, the intensity of the social and environmental crisis, the struggle for racial and social justice and the concern with
the physical impact of industrial technology upon the quality of life and
upon life itself inevitably lead to a reexamination of previously accepted
institutions and relationships. The large corporation as a major influence
in the society is, along with the society, swept up in the process for change.
Similarly, the acceptance of the ill-defined concept of corporate social
responsibility has given rise to a reconsideration of the basic objectives of the
corporation. Such reconsideration inevitably involves reconsideration of
structure, especially board structure.
t This article is a revised version of a paper presented at a Symposium sponsored
jointly by the National Affiliation of Concerned Business Students and the School of
Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley, in November 1972. The
original article will appear in a book entitled The Unstable Ground: Corporate Social
Policy in a Dynamic Society (S. Prakash Sethi ed.) (publication pending, 1973, Melville
Publishing Co., Los Angeles).
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B., 1939, Harvard College; J.D.,
1942, Harvard Law School. Member of New York and Massachusetts bar.
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C.

Lack of Accountability

Management of the large public corporation lacks accountability. Although there is still argument to the contrary,' it is difficult not to conclude
that with the separation of ownership and control resulting from the
widespread distribution of shares, shareholders in the large corporation,
generally speaking, no longer have an effective, independent voice in the
selection of the board or in other matters submitted for their consideration.
Except in unusual cases, the board members have become a self-perpetuating
group, accountable only to themselves or perhaps to the chief executive
officer who was responsible for their selection (and who, himself, is accountable to no one). Occasional exceptions may be found where significant
minority ownership groups can exert power. Also, the ability of management to rule unchallenged by take-over threats from outsiders may rest on
2
its continued ability to achieve minimally acceptable earnings per share.
In the typical case, however, management lacks accountability. Although
institutional shareholders appear to possess the power to control corporate
decision-making, there is no evidence that this potential power has been
exercised in the United States.
D. Lack of Legitimacy
The corporation is no longer an enterprise that significantly involves
only its owner-managers. It affects wide segments of the society. "Private" has
become "public." In contrast, the social and economic groups whose lives
and fortunes are profoundly affected by the corporation have no role in its
direction. Regulation through government in specified areas of conduct is
regarded by some as only a limited and inadequate response. Such reform
groups want the affected social and economic groups to participate in
corporate decision-making. They demand changes in the board because it is
unrepresentative. Even if the board were not self-perpetuating and the stockholders possessed power of selection in realistic terms, the problem of
legitimacy of a board of directors reflecting solely stockholder interests
would remain. 3 The problem of accountability might be resolved, but the
issue of legitimacy would still remain.
E.

Rejection of the Concept of Managerialism

This conviction, that the interests of vitally affected groups are not receiving adequate consideration in the corporate decision-making process, represents a rejection of the concept of managerialism. This is the concept that
the board of directors acts as a trustee not solely for stockholders but for
employees, consumers, the community and other groups as well, and that
1 See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 33-53 (1969).
2 See Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1427 (1964).
3 See Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in The Corporation in
Modern Society 25, 40-41 (E. Mason ed. 1960); Manning, Book Review, 67 Yale L.J. 1477,
1490-91 (1958).
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the function of the board is to mediate among the legitimate claims of these
conflicting groups. Although this view of the board repeatedly occurs in
the American and English literature, 4 it has little support in reality.
Further, it runs directly contrary to the established legal principle that the
board of directors owes single-minded loyalty to the advancement of the
interests of stockholders. 5
II.

PURPOSES TO BE ACHIEVED BY REFORM OF THE BOARD oF DIREcToRS

The different reform proposals that have emerged as a result of these
factors have a fundamental common objective. They seek to transform the
large corporation into a "public" institution, in which the public or the
groups affected by the corporation participate in a meaningful manner in
the corporation's decision-making process. It is expected that accountability
and legitimacy will be achieved by such transformation of the "private"
institution into a "public" institution. These reform proposals may be
divided into two different classes: efforts to broaden the perspectives of the
board, and more sweeping proposals for change in the very structure of the
board through the addition of "special interest" or "public" representatives.
A.

Broadening the Perspectives of the Board

One approach is to strengthen the board by the addition of members who
can introduce fresh perspectives or "inputs" into the board decision-making
process. This may be termed the "window-out" aspect: the addition of directors with different backgrounds and experience who can provide a fresh
look at the problem, or a new window through which the board can look
out at the world. A related objective is to provide additional public disclosure, to achieve a ventilation of the decision-making process, to reduce the
secrecy of the inner corporate circle, and to improve channels of communication. This may be termed the "window-in" aspect: increased disclosure to
increase public influence in the board deliberations.6
B. Board Representation for Interest Groups or the Public
A more far-reaching proposal is to achieve the transformation of the
corporation into a "public" institution through representation on the board
of the "special" interests affected by the corporation or of "public" or
"government" representatives. The essence of "special interest" representa4 See M. Fogarty, Company and Corporation-One Law? 8-10 (1965); E. Stein, Harmonization of European Company Laws 81-82 (1971); Eisenberg, supra note I, at 21 (1970);
Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Responsibility, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 248, 277-78 (1969).
5 E.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("A
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the benefit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.") Accord, Parke v.
Daily News Ltd., [1962] 1 Ch. 927, 963. See L. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law
522 (3d ed. 1969) (Professor Gower regards the traditional view as "increasingly anachronistic"); H. Henn, Law of Corporations 475 (2d ed. 1970).
6 See Vanderwicken, Change Invades the Board Room, Fortune, May 1972, at 156.
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tion is that the "representatives" reflect the interests of the group selecting
them, rather than the interests of the institution in whose governance they
are participating. In its most stringent form, such representatives would
receive their instructions from the interest group, report to the interest
group, and, in the last analysis, retain their positions only so long as the
interest group which they represent is satisfied with their militancy and
effectiveness. Where an organized constituency to perform such a supervisory
function does not exist, one may inquire as to the accountability of the
"representative." This is an effort to achieve political or economic influence
for an economic or social class. Thus, insofar as employee representation is
concerned, it is an attempt to strengthen union power.
Proposals for worker representation also reflect a desire for industrial
democracy or social, as well as economic, justice for employees3 It is part of
an effort to achieve greater employee individual fulfillment and job satisfaction through employee participation in decision-making on all levels.
Board representation is only an aspect of the larger movement for greater
employee participation.
III.

BROADENING THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE BOARD

Of all the reform proposals, the only one that has any vitality at the
present time is the growing movement to strengthen the board through the
addition of individuals who can bring fresh perspectives and values to the
board deliberations-the "window-out" aspect. 8 The American corporate
scene is changing. Long neglected groups-blacks, women, nonbusiness men,
foreign nationals, young people-are supplying persons who are being
elected to the boards of the major corporations.
A.

Introduction of New Perspectives to Boards
1. Blacks

At the present time, approximately 70 major American corporations as
well as both the New York and American Stock Exchanges have elected
blacks to their boards of directors. Black members on the board of directors
are becoming a part of the accepted pattern of American corporate life.9
2. Women
The same pressures which have contributed to the election of black
directors have also produced a corresponding trend toward the election of
7 See I. Adizes, Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Style (1971); Paul Blumberg, Industrial
Democracy (1968); H. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (1960); H. Clegg,
Industrial Democracy and Nationalization (1951); F. Emery & E. Thorsrud, Form and Content in Industrial Democracy (1969); Irish Management Institute, Industrial Democracy:
A Symposium (1969); P. Van Gorkum, Industrial Democracy in the Netherlands-A Seminar (1969). The discussion in this article on employee representation follows the author's
presentation of The Constituencies of the Corporation: New Directions for Employees,
before the American Bar Association National Institute, Corporations Under Attack:
Response to New Challenges, Oct. 27, 1972, New York, N.Y., reprinted in 28 Bus. Law. 177
(Special Issue, Mar. 1973). See also Blumberg, Book Review, 50 Texas L, Rev. 598 (1972).
s See text accompanying note 6 supra.
9 Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
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women directors to the board. 10 At the present time, approximately 20 major
American corporations have women directors. The recent action of General
Motors in adding a woman to its board" will no doubt accelerate this
process. In view of the disparaging comments on the relative lack of success
at the corporate polls of various "public interest" shareholder proxy proposals, it is worthy of note that the election by General Motors of black and
women directors unquestionably reflects to some degree the pressures generated by Campaign GM.
3. Nonbusiness Persons
The wisdom of broadening the composition of the board has been recognized by such corporations as Dayton-Hudson Corporation and First Pennsylvania Company, which have added nonbusiness persons to their boards
precisely because they brought a new perspective not previously represented
12
in the board deliberations.
4. Foreign Nationals
A fourth category is the addition of foreign nationals to the boards of
American corporations conducting significant parts of their business abroad.
This process is in its early stages, but there are increasing signs of recognition that the boards of the American multinational corporation should include persons of non-American origin in order to function more effectively.'5
B. The Selection Process
The foregoing are attempts to strengthen the board by broadening its perspectives through the addition of new "inputs" in the decision-making
process. They are clearly not intended to add "representatives" of a "constituency," who are designated by, report back to, receive instructions from,
or are accountable to their constituency.
At the same time, they represent a symbolic effort of profound significance to give recognition to the aspirations of unrecognized groups for
a fuller participation in the decision-making process. They simultaneously
symbolize the dedication of the board to nondiscriminatory principles in
the operation of the enterprise.
The selection of such new directors by the board itself has certain obvious
strengths and weaknesses.
On the one hand, the selection by the board assures the new member of
a harmonious reception, a full inclusion in the deliberations of the board,
and a board audience that will listen to the views of the new member. The
10 Time, Oct. 16, 1972, at 85. Although a recent study by The Conference Board and
the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. of 851 corporations revealed 65 companies with women on their boards, more than half of these had a substantial stock
ownership in the firm. Their presence on the board, no doubt, reflects this ownership
interest rather than an effort to introduce a new perspective. J. Bacon, Corporate Directorship Practices: Membership and Committees of the Board 5-6 (1973).
11 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1972, at 61, col. 4.
12 See Dayton-Hudson Corp., Quarterly Report (inside front cover) (1971); N.Y. Times,

Jan. 24, 1972, at 59, col. 2.
18 See Bus. Week, Aug. 19, 1972, at 60.
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new member has been invited by the board; he or she has not been forced
upon it.
On the other hand, without independence and firmness on the part of
the individuals in question, the board action has limited significance. Putting aside the basic question of whether the board as a whole really has a
decisive impact on corporate policy or whether it is a prisoner of the
corporate bureaucracy or technostructure, it is obvious that the addition of
an isolated black or woman director or two does not change the allocation of
power within the corporation. Although such action may, therefore, not unfairly be described as tokenism, such a description does not do justice to the
development. The presence of even a single member of the board who is
black or female will unquestionably have impact on the employment
policies of the corporation. The selection of the black or woman director
confirms the board's readiness to adopt nondiscriminatory policies, and the
presence of the interested minority director on the board provides a method
of assuring that the policies become reality. Finally, symbolic gestures, even
if the addition of such directors is regarded as having no other meaning, may
have considerable significance because of their influence on public attitudes.
IV.

SPECIAL INTEREST "REPRESENTATION"

As noted, the proposals for special interest "representation" have objectives
more profound than simply broadening the perspectives of the board. They
seek to change the allocation of power within the corporation, to assure
affected groups of participation in the decisions that involve them and to
achieve accountability and legitimacy for the corporation.
There have been recent "public interest" shareholder proxy proposals for
many types of special interest representatives: employees, consumers, women,
minority groups, dealers, suppliers, environmentalists, persons experienced
in conversion from military to nonmilitary production, public interest advocates and even investment bankers.1 4 Many of these are clearly intended
solely as symbolic gestures, or are justified in terms of broadening board
perspectives without, at least for the moment, really undertaking a campaign
for a reallocation of corporate power. They have attracted limited support
thus far.' 5
14 E.g., American Tel. ge Tel. Co., Notice of Meeting and Proxy Statement, Apr. 19,
1972, at 13-15; American Tel. & Tel. Co., Notice of Meeting and Proxy Statement, Apr. 22,
1971,, at 12-13; Chrysler Corp., Notice of Meeting and Proxy Statement, Mar. 3, 1972, at
25; Ford Motor Co., Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement, Apr. 7, 1972, at 20-21;
General Motors Corp., Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement, Apr. 5, 1971, at
34-37; General Motors Corp., Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement, Apr. 6,
1970, at 19-20; Honeywell, Inc., Notice of Meeting and Proxy Statement, Apr. 2, 1971,
at 8; Jewel Companies, Inc., Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement, May 15,
1972, at 10-11; Northern States Power Co., Notice of Meeting and Proxy Statement,
May 10, 1972, at 8-9.
15 The Northern States Power proposal to add two "public interest advocates" received
9.13% of the votes cast; the Chrysler proposal to add "women and representatives of employee organizations, consumers and minority groups" received 4.91%, and the identical
American Telephone & Telegraph proposal received 3.80%. The remaining proposals
received less than 3% of the votes. Council on Economic Priorities, Economic Priorities
Report, July-Aug. 1972, at 49-50.
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A.

Employee Directors
The proposal for employee representatives on the board of directors is
unquestionably the most serious of the proposals for special interest representation. It reflects the self-evident fact that of all the groups affected by
the corporation, including the stockholders, it is the employees upon whom
the corporation has the most important impact-an impact that is continuous, pervasive and profound.1 6 The suggestion naturally follows that, as the
group most affected by corporation action, employees are entitled to participate in corporate decision-making, including representation on the board
level.
The proposal is reenforced by the German experience, where industry
has prospered notwithstanding two decades of employee representation on
the board, and the increasing acceptance in Europe generally of the principle of employee representation.
It is worthy of note that the corporation laws of several states at one time
permitted the election of directors by employees-voting separately from
shareholders-where the charter or by-laws of the corporation so provided. T
The crucial aspect about the proposals for employee representation on
American boards of directors is that they do not reflect any serious objective
of the American trade union movement or of workers generally. The proposals are being advanced without grass roots support.' 8
B.

Consumer, Supplier or Dealer Directors

There is no experience available to assist in determining the significance
of proposals for consumer, supplier or dealer directors. There is little or no
support for these proposals; they are purely theoretical or symbolic. Further,
there are serious mechanical problems in determining the constituency:
Who is entitled to vote? How are votes allocated? What distinction between
major and incidental purchasers or suppliers? What distinction between
individuals and corporate purchasers or suppliers? What procedures for
notice to the persons affected, for the conduct of a contested campaign, for
the election itself?19 The election by shareholders of consumer, supplier, or
dealer nominees sidesteps some of these problems. On the other hand,
shareholder election eliminates much of the significance of the proposal.
Further, the mechanical problems reappear with the problem of nomination.
16 See L. Gower, supra note 5, at 10-11:

In so far as there is any true association in the modern public company it is between
management and workers rather than between the shareholders inter se or between
them and management ....
[T]he employees are members of the company for which
they work to a far greater extent than are the shareholders whom the law persists
in regarding as its proprietors.
17 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156, § 23 (1932) (repealed); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14.9-1 to -3 (1957).
(repealed) (employees); E. Dodd & R. Baker, I Cases on Business Associations-Corporations 196 n.21 (1940). Cf. H. Ballantine, Corporations 498 (rev. ed. 1946) (listing statutes
providing for election by creditors).
18 See text accompanying notes 66-67 infra.
19 See Flynn, Corporate Democracy-Who Needs It?, at 22 (Address to Conference on
Corporate Accountability, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 30, 1971); Eisenberg, supra note 1,
at 16-21; Dahl, Citizens of the Corporation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1971, at 45, col. 5.
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It should be noted that there are consumer or supplier directors on boards
whenever a corporation adds a representative of a major supplier or customer to its board as a method of assuring continuance of the business
relationship.2 0 This, however, is clearly not the sort of consumer or supplier
representation envisioned by the reform groups making such proposals.
The desirability of adding consumer directors to the board receives little
support from the history of the consumer-owned enterprises in this country,
such as the mutual insurance companies owned by policyholders or the
mutual savings banks owned by depositors. 21 These consumer-owned companies invariably involve self-perpetuating boards and have demonstrated
no discernible additional degree of concern for consumers that differs from
the attitudes of their stockholder-owned competitors. If possible, there is
even a lesser degree of accountability because of the absence of the stock
market as a measure of performance and the take-over bid as a possible
discipline.
Finally, as Dean Rostow pointed out more than a decade ago, extension
of the corporate franchise to such special interests would only add "new
groups of apathetic and disinterested voters to the masses of stockholders
who now fail to exercise their franchise intelligently."22 Robert Townsend
similarly observes that "there is no way to select representatives of specialinterest groups, no way to give them a legitimate power base."a
C.

Stockholders as "Special Interest" Directors

Another "special interest" group, which has not been the subject of such
proposals, paradoxically appears to be the only group that may realistically
hope to achieve such recognition in the foreseeable future. These are the
stockholders themselves. As pointed out, although the stockholders elect
the board as a matter of form, it is apparent that this is fiction. Through
control of the corporate proxy solicitation machinery, the board in fact
selects itself and obtains its election from passive stockholders who, as a practical matter, are unable to act independently or effectively. The board may,
therefore, be fairly said to represent itself, not the stockholders.
Financial institutions-mutual funds, investment trusts, bank trust departments, pension and welfare funds-have substantial concentrated holdings in many public corporations.
The Patman Subcommittee Report in 1968 disclosed a surprising extent
24
of ownership concentrated in the trust departments of commercial banks.
20 See W. Puckey, The Board-Room 89 (1969).
21 See Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance Companies, 1969

Wis. L. Rev. 1068; Kreider, Who Owns the Mutuals? Proposals for Reform of Membership Rights in Mutual Insurance and Banking Companies, 41 U. Gin. L. Rev. 275 (1972).
22 Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in
The Corporation in Modern Society 56 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
25 Townsend, The Ups and Downs of Working Life, Center Magazine, Jan.-Feb. 1972,
at 27, 34.
24 Staff of Subcomm. on Domestic Fin., House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., Commercial Banks and Their Trust Activities: Emerging Influence on
the American Economy (Comm. Print 1968).
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The Institutional Investor Study of the Securities and Exchange Commission, based on a major sampling of institutions and employing conservative
assumptions, concluded that, as of September 30, 1969, financial institutions
with the largest holdings held the following percentages of the shares of the
ten largest corporations (ranked by market value):
Percentage
Held

Corporation

Number of
Institutions

International Business Machines
American Telephone 8 Telegraph
General Motors
Exxon
Eastman Kodak

81
130
79
101
102

40%
10
20
30
40

Sears Roebuck
Texaco
General Electric
Xerox
Gulf Oil

106
62
69
76
102

45
30
30
50
50

Most of this was held by bank trust departments. The figures may give a
misleading impression, however, since in some cases the bank either had
no voting power or shared voting power with others. 25
Looking at the holdings of mutual funds, one finds that a high percentage
of shares of a limited number of major companies, particularly airlines, is
held by the funds. The following example is as of June 30, 1972:26

Corporation

Number of
Mutual Fund
Holders

Percentage
Held

Trans World Airlines
Eastern Air Lines
American Broadcasting
Northwest Air Lines
Brunswick Corporation

77
64
55
72
62

34.1%
33.9
29.3
28.0
24.4

Seaboard Coast Line Industries
Delta Air Lines
MGIC Investment
Philip Morris
American Air Lines

45
54
61
59
88

23.5
21.4
20.4
19.6
18.5

According to a New York Stock Exchange study, 28.3 percent of the equity
shares of listed corporations was held in 1971 by pension funds and financial institutions. The total exceeds 40 percent with the inclusion of nonbank
25
26

H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, pt. 5, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2564, 2583 (1971).
Vickers Associates, Inc., Vickers Favorite Fifty UJune 30, 1972).
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trusts, foreign institutions, investment partnerships and unregistered mutual funds. 27 These institutions possess the power, if they were prepared to
act in concert, to express the traditional powers of owners and elect their
representatives to the board.
The potential power clearly exists but, as the Institutional Investor Study
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission concluded, it is as
yet unexercised.2 8 Nor is there any indication that such institutions are
now, or in the future will be, ready to act in concert. 29 Recognition that
exercise of management control over portfolio companies has little advantage and serious disadvantage will most likely mean that such potential
power will rarely, if ever, be exercised through concerted action of the financial institutions. Designation of directors on the boards of portfolio companies would not only limit flexibility of institutions in disposing of their
shares but would make them highly vulnerable to public criticism of interlocking directorates and to increased regulatory controls. Such concern with
the possibility of governmental controls has obviously increased with the
critical Patman subcommittee report on the shareholdings of banks and
trust companies in their fiduciary capacities.8 0
A somewhat more likely possibility is pressure by institutions for the election of prominent public figures to the board-not to represent them as
such but to represent public stockholders generally. If such a development
were to occur, it could constitute a form of "special interest" representation
for shareholders. The objectives of such "shareholder" directors presumably would be generally congruent with the objectives of the incumbent
management, except perhaps in the area of executive compensation. Such
directors, not dependent on management favor for their selection, could
function as genuinely "independent" directors, and a measure of accountability would be achieved.
A similar possibility that has been suggested is the appointment of a fiduciary to represent shareholders, patterned after the indenture trustee who
acts on behalf of bondholders. 81
27 N.Y. Stock Exchange, 1972 Fact Book, at 50. During 1971, institutions were responsible for 68.2% of the dollar volume of all trading on the New York Stock Exchange (excluding members' trading for their own accounts). Id. at 53.
28 H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, pt. 5, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2561, 2749-70 (1971); H.R. Doc. No.
92-64, pt. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 124-25 (1971).
29 One of the isolated cases in which institutional investors have acted in concert to
protect their position as shareholders is United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
91,288 (Baltimore City, Md. Cir. Ct. 1963) (injunctive relief obtained
against proposed issuance of nonvoting common stock that probably would have resulted
in delisting from the N.Y. Stock Exchange). Institutional investors have also played some
role in connection with transfers of control. See H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, pt. 5, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2771-843 (1971); H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, pt. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 125-27 (1971). See
generally R. Barber, The American Corporation 53-69 (1970); Why the Big Traders
Worry Industry, Bus. Week, July 25, 1970, at 53-61.
80 Staff of Subcomm. on Domestic Fin., House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., Commercial Banks and Their Trust Activities: Emerging Influence on the
American Economy (Comm. Print 1968).
81 See Vagts, Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 49 (1966).
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The question, however, is whether such form of shareholder representation deals with the fundamental problem. It may restore a measure of accountability and introduce "public" influence into what is no longer regarded as a "private" institution. It restores legitimacy, however, only if one
is prepared to accept the shareholder in the large American corporation as
a person entitled to the traditional perquisites of ownership notwithstanding his basic relationship as a temporary investor or supplier of capital,
or as Mason describes him: "a functionless rentier."3 2 It clearly does not
provide any recognition for the other interests in the society whose interests
are vitally affected by the corporation and who play no role in the decisionmaking process.
V.

"PUBLIC"

OR "PROFESSIONAL"

DIRECTORS

Still another approach to the problem is the addition of "public" or
"professional" directors to the board suggested by Justice Douglas 30 years
ago as a method of protecting public investors. 33 Mr. Townsend has recently
revived the proposal, has changed its orientation by charging the "public"
directors with a quasi-trusteeship to represent not simply public investors
but the community at large, and has added supporting features for funding
34
and staff assistance.
A private individual effort in this direction was recently unsuccessfully
attempted by a prominent New York banker who resigned from the bank
after he had been passed over in the selection of a new chief executive for
the institution. Notwithstanding his impeccable business credentials and
his professed readiness to devote himself solely to service as a "professional"
director, the response was inadequate and he joined an investment banking
firm after a year or so.35
A basic problem with the "public" or "professional" director is the question of selection. Who is the appointing authority? If it is the board that
does the appointing, the "public" director becomes simply a variation of
the efforts of a board to broaden its perspectives by including individuals
with different values among its membership. 36 Indeed, the election of Professor Paul Ylvisaker-now Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education-to the Dayton-Hudson Board may be said to represent the election
of just such a "public" director. 37 Similarly, if the New York banker in
Mason, Introduction, The Corporation in Modern Society 2 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
W. Douglas, Democracy and Finance 52-54 (1940); see Patton, The Working Director
-Management's Middleman, The Conf. Bd. Record; Oct. 1972, at 36.
34 Townsend, supra note 23, at 27, 34-36; N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1971, at 34, col. 3.
35 See Wall St. J., May 3, 1972, at 6, col. 4; Vanderwicken, supra note 6, at 285.
36 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
37 In electing Dr. Paul N. Ylvisaker to its board of directors, Dayton-Hudson Corp.
noted:
One of the nation's leading social scientists, Dr. Ylvisaker is professor of public affairs
and urban planning at Princeton University and was New Jersey's first Commissioner
of Community Affairs. We believe he brings to the board a valuable non-business
perspective that will help the Corporation respond appropriately to the changing
forces at work in society.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., Quarterly Report (inside front cover) (1971). For similar reasons,
32
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question had been more successful, he might also have been said to represent such a "professional" director.
Such steps, however desirable, hardly represent a fundamental change in
board composition. So long as the "public" or "professional" director is
without a constituency or an appointing agency with public influence, the
extent of change of corporate objectives will not be major.
The successful movement for the designation of "outside" directors generally represents an effort to get "public" representation on the board. The
difficulty has been that selection of "outside" directors from within the
"club"-corporate executives, commercial or investment bankers, insurance
company executives, corporate attorneys, university presidents or business
school professors-has not placed persons on the board with new values or
different concepts of the role or responsibility of the corporation in society.
It has unquestionably strengthened the board and has introduced disinterested directors able to review management compensation or serve on
the Audit Committee. These are highly desirable steps forward, but hardly
constitute sweeping reform.
The New York Stock Exchange has successfully pressed for the election
of at least two "outside" directors 3s to the boards of listed corporations. If
the Exchange were to go even further and require as a condition to listing
that listed corporations elect to their boards persons selected from a panel
nominated by the Exchange or some other independent agency, it might
further implement the pressure for "outside" directors and Justice Douglas'
objective of further protecting investors. It would, however, hardly satisfy
reformers intent on achieving power within the corporation for those nonshareholder groups presently unrepresented upon whom the conduct of
corporate affairs has such a profound impact.
In any event, it is clear that the effectiveness of "outside,....
public" or
"professional" directors will be severely limited so long as they are parttime, not well compensated and are not assisted by their own staff.39
VI.

GOVERNMENT DIRECTORS

A remaining alternative for structural reform is the addition of "government" directors to represent the public interest. This does not seem a satisfactory solution. The thought of a government representative in every board
room stirs little enthusiasm. Lack of confidence in the appointing authority,
lack of confidence in the type of individual likely to be selected, and concern for further increase in centralized governmental power obviously contribute to such lack of enthusiasm. The appointees of President Nixon, for
example, would not likely be regarded as allies of social reform groups in
their efforts to change the direction of corporate policy.
First Pennsylvania Company elected a youth, in addition to a black and a woman, to its
board. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1972, at 59, col. 2.
88 N.Y. Stock Exchange, The Corporate Director and the Investing Public 7 (1965).
89 Compare [former Justice] Goldberg, Memorandum in Reference to the Proposal to
the Board of Directors of Trans World Airlines for the Election of a Committee of Overseers (unpublished 1972) with Blough, The "Outside" Director at Work on the Board,
Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 202 (Mar. 1973).
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The limited experience in the United States with government-appointed
41
directors in the Union Pacific Railroad, 40 the Illinois Central Railroad,
42
the Prudential Life Insurance Company, instills little confidence that such
representatives will help produce decisions that better reflect the "public
interest." Although the experience with government directors in such newer
ventures as the Communications Satellite Corporation is still limited, there
is no indication thus far that it will provide a meaningful redirection of
corporate affairs toward greater social sensitivity.
Nor does the European experience with government directors provide
support for the proposal. Neither the British experience over two decades
with government directors on the boards of nationalized companies nor the
French experience in similar circumstances has proved particularly effective. 43 A greater degree of public accountability and sensitivity to the needs
of the community at large does not appear to have been attained.
The Swedish and German governments have both experimented on a
limited basis with government directors on the boards of private companies.
Although it has been suggested that the Swedish experience has not been
entirely satisfactory, except perhaps in the banking area,44 the Swedish Socialist Government is pressing for the mandatory appointment of government representatives to the boards of approximately 30 of the largest
45
investment companies and foundations.
VII.

THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE WITH EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION

The impetus of the proposals for employee representation on the board
or the more sweeping reform of employee ownership and management of
industry arises largely from the extensive European experience.
A.

Co-determination

The major support for the concept of employee directors arises from the
German experience with "co-determination," or employee directors on the
Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat), the upper board in the two-tier German
board structure. This upper board elects the members of the Managing
Board (Vorstand) and supervises and inspects, but does not manage. The
40 See Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private Corporation-The
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 350, 361 (1965).
41 See Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1972, at 14, col. 4. (Under the 1851 charter of the railroad,
the Governor of Illinois is an ex-officio director. Governor Ogilvie asked the Illinois
legislature to repeal the requirement.)
42 N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 17B:18-19, -20 (1971) (the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey is authorized to appoint six "public directors" to the 28-man board).
48 See L. Gower, supra note 5, at 60: "The [English] public corporation solves the
problems of the relation between shareholders and managers by abolishing the former,
but this does not solve the problem of controlling the managers." Drago, Public Enterprises in France, in Government Enterprise 113 (W. Friedmann & J. Garner eds. 1970);
Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Comparative Analysis, in id. 315.
44 See 12 Bus. Europe 104 (1972); Mclnnes, Flight from Sweden, Barron's, Aug. 24, 1970,
at 11.
45 N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1972, § 1, at 28, col. 1; Letter from William B. Dozier, Counselor of the United States Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden for Economic/Commercial Affairs, to Prof. Phillip I. Blumberg, Feb. 20, 1973, on file in Boston University School
of Law Library.
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Managing Board is the executive arm of the corporation, combining both
the direction of day-to-day operations and policymaking. In steel, coal and
iron firms with 1,000 or more employees which have full co-determination,
employee representatives comprise one-half of the Supervisory Board and
hold a veto power over the designation of the Labor Director on the Managing Board. In other industries which have only partial co-determination, employee representation is restricted to one-third of the Supervisory Board. 46
The results of the German experience are mixed. In steel, iron and coal,
where labor representation includes one-half of the Supervisory Board as
well as a veto power over the designation of the Labor Director on the Managing Board, full co-determination seems to have provided labor with an
effective share of power, has apparently contributed to reduced labor strife
and generally has worked satisfactorily. In other industries, where labor
representation is restricted to one-third membership on the Supervisory
Board, or partial co-determination, labor representation generally has been
regarded as not particularly meaningful. Power in fact has not been shared.
Often, labor representation has not been taken seriously and has served as
a source of sinecures for old faithful trade union officials, with management
47
control essentially unimpaired.
The German model of the dual board having one-third labor representation on the upper board has been adopted in the proposed statute for a
European Company (Societas Europaea) in the European Economic Community and in the proposals of the European Commission for harmonization of company law in the member states of the Community. 48 The French
Law of June 18, 1966, similarly requires the representation of two nonvoting labor directors on the boards of public corporations (socidtes anonymes).49 The Netherlands has also required worker representation on the
upper board. 50
40 Law of May 21, 1951, [1951) 1 BGBI. 347; Law of Oct. 14, 1952, [1952] 1 BGBI.
681; Law of Aug. 7, 1956, [1956] BGBl. 707, as amended, Law of July 15, 1957, [1957]
1 BGBl. 714. For a general review of the German experience, see The Company 213-21
(C. DeHoghton ed. 1970); M. Fogarty, note 4 supra; A. Shuchman, Codetermination:
Labor's Middle Way in Germany (1957); H. Spiro, The Politics of German Codetermination
(1958); Frame, Worker Participation: With Particular Reference to Codetermination in
the Federal Republic of Germany, 5 Vict. U.L. Rev. 417 (1970); Vagts, supra note 31, at
23.
47 See M. Fogarty, supra note 4, at 120-21, 126-28; D. Granick, The European Executive
220 (1962).

48 Comm'n of the European Communities, Proposed Statute for the European Company
art. 137(1), Supp. to Bull. 8-1970 of the European Communities. See Sanders, The European Company on Its Way, 8 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 29 (1971); Storm, A New Impulse
Towards a European Company, 26 Bus. Law. 1443 (1971).
49 The works council (comitd d'enterprise) of a socidtd anonyme may appoint two of its
members who are to be present in a nonvoting advisory capacity at all meetings of
conseil d'administration, in corporations using the single board system, or the conseil de
surveillance, or upper board, in corporations using the dual board system. Law No. 66-427
of June 18, 1966. See CCH Common Mkt. Rep., European Stock Corporation 177
(P. Sanders ed. 1969).
50 Law of April 1, 1971; 17 Bus. Intl 331 (1970); Europe, Oct. 6, 1972, at 6.
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Yugoslav Worker Self-Management

The Yugoslav experience with worker-owned industry has attracted worldwide attention. As a unique blend of socially owned enterprise operated
both for profit under market conditions and for the benefit, after payment
of capital charges, of the workers employed in the enterprise, the Yugoslav
model is most interesting. Control is in the hands of the plant workers and
the local communes, with the League of Communists playing a significant
role behind the scenes. The shift of the locus of power from the federal
government to the plant and the local community reflects the strong centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia that make decentralization politically desirablethe divisive influences separating the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians,
Montenegrins and other ethnic groups in the nation. The development has
been associated with problems of capital formation and a high level of inflation that apparently reflect, at least in part, worker pressure for short-term
profit maximization. Paradoxically, concern with short-term objectives may
be greater in worker self-managed Yugoslav industry than in the United
States, where management has been increasingly inclined to be concerned
with long-term view. 5'
Whatever the intellectual interest in this experiment, it is hardly a realistic alternative. Even Professor Dahl, one of its leading American proponents,
concedes the unlikeliness of American labor support for the program. He
visualizes its possible adoption in the United States as a result of middle
class pressure.5 2 It may be noted that, at the present time, there is not the
slightest indication of any substantial support for this visionary conclusion.
C. Sweden
Sweden now requires employee representation on the board. A number
of companies, including Volvo, have experimented with the voluntary designation of employee directors as part of a campaign to deal with job dissatisfaction. The 1971 Conference of the Confederation of Swedish Trade
Unions demanded the designation of two employee representatives on all
boards. 53 The Swedish Parliament subsequently enacted a statute providing
for the mandatory appointment of two employee directors to the boards of
54
all companies with more than 100 employees.
D.

Norway

Effective January 1, 1973, the Act of May 12, 1972 enacted by the Storting
[Norwegian Parliament] requires that one-third of the Management Board
51 For a general review of the Yugoslav experience, see I. Adizes, note 7 supra; M. Brockmayer, Yugoslav Workers' Selfmanagement (1970); C. DeHoghton, supra note 46, at 320-36;
J. Kolaja, Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience (1966); G. Macesich, Yugoslavia:
The Theory and Practice of Development Planning (1964); S. Pejovich, The MarketPlanned Economy of Yugoslavia (1966); J. Vanek, The Participatory Economy (1971).
52 R. Dahl, After the Revolution? 134-36 (1970).
53 See Lidbom, Industrial Democracy in Sweden, Free Labour World, Nov. 1971, at 14;
11 Bus. Europe 310 (1971); 18 Bus. Int'l 175 (1971).
54 See note 45 supra.
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be elected by employees from their own ranks in corporations with 50 or
more employees. In companies with more than 200 employees, the statute
created a new corporate organ, a Board of Representatives consisting of
one-third employee and two-thirds shareholder representatives. The Board
of Representatives will elect the Management Board and have the final
decisions on important investment decisions and on reorganization signifi55
cantly affecting the labor force.
E.

Conflicting European Trade Union Attitudes

An illuminating aspect of the European experience is the mixed nature
of trade union reaction to proposals for employee representation on the
board.
The English unions in the past have traditionally opposed such representation. As C.A.R. Crosland puts it, English union attitudes have displayed,
"not merely apathy but a barely concealed hostility."5 6 They regarded board
representation as involving a confusion in roles and impairing their ability
to challenge management. The union has been perceived as "the opposition" and therefore by definition would not participate in the exercise of
board power. Unions in the Netherlands also previously opposed labor representation on the board. 57,
In recent years, British union attitudes have tended to change. Before the
Donovan Commission, some union representatives argued for voluntary participation on the boards of nonnationalized industries. A minority of the
Commission agreed, but the Commission Report regarded such a movement
as unwise and premature. 58
In sharp contrast, the German unions have regarded board membership
as an objective of high priority. It has replaced socialism as the objective of
the trade union movement. 59 At the present time, German unions are pressing for the extension of full co-determination or one-half representation on
the boards of all German corporations, rather than solely in iron, coal and
steel. 60
The Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions has taken a middle ground.
It has endorsed mandatory employee representation on the board while emphasizing that the Confederation would maintain its independence of action. 61
55 Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Industrial Democracy in Norway 8
(UDA 167/72).
56 C. Crosland, The Conservative Enemy 218 (1962).
57 See The Future of Public Ownership 21 (Fabian Soc'y Tract No. 344, 1963);
W. Puckey, supra note 20, at 96-97 C'I have yet to hear a senior [English] union official

give whole hearted support to worker representation on boards in the private sector.");

C. DeHoghton, supra note 46, at 225-26.
58 See L. Gower, supra note 5, at 63 n.53; Drake, The Public Corporation as an Organ
of Government Policy, in Government Enterprise 39 (W. Friedmann & J. Garner eds. 1970).
59 H. Spiro, supra note 46, at 5, 35-36, 39-41.
60 Friedrich, German Co-Determination: Parity Is the Goal, Colum. J. World Bus.,
Jan.-Feb. 1970, at 49; C. DeHoghton, supra note 46, at 220-21, 361-68, 370.
61 See Geijer, Industrial Democracy in the Seventies, Free Labour World, Apr. 1971, at
15.
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F. Latin America
In his recent review of Latin American enterprise, Professor Bayitch reports the establishment of co-determination in nationalized industries in
four countries. After observing that nationalization represented a reaction
to foreign ownership rather than a movement for social reform, he notes
that 'there has been provision for substantial employee representation on
the boards of nationalized Latin American industries, including electric
utilities in Argentina, tin in Bolivia, copper in Chile and oil and railways
in Mexico. The Peruvian industrial reform law also provides for employee
62
membership on the board.
VIII.

PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY REFORM PROPOSALS GENERALLY

The proposals for "special interest" representation on the board present
serious problems.
A.

Limitations on the Applicability of the Foreign Experience

There is a complete lack of such experience in the United States. We can
only speculate how solutions attempted in cultures abroad might function
at home. It is evident that experiments in industrial organization outside
the United States may provide some insight and understanding in appraising possible change in American industrial organization to deal with the
known problems of the existing order. This, however, does not mean that
European models may be expected to function in the same manner within
the vastly different economic and political climates in the United States.
The European experience reflects German solutions to German needs and
Yugoslav solutions to Yugoslav needs. To lift these solutions from their political, economic, historical and cultural setting and transport them to the
United States is of dubious validity. As Professor Friedrich has noted, codetermination is "deeply imbedded in German past experience and traditions." 68 There are no applicable parallels in the United States.
B.

Conflict of Interest

To whom would the "special interest" directors owe primary loyalty?
Under traditional corporation law, the director owes undivided loyalty to
the corporation and to the shareholders; further, such loyalty runs to all
shareholders and not merely to those who elected him.6 4 Would not the
"special interest" directors designated to represent the interests of the group
responsible for his designation be confronted with a fundamental conflict
of interest?
62 Bayitch, Empresa in Latin American Law: Recent Developments, 4 Lawyer of the
Americas 399, 429-33 (1972); N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, at 16, col. 1; Wall St. J., Aug. 4,
1972, at 6, col. 4; Comment, The Peruvian General Law of Industries, 12 Harv. Int'l L.J.
312 (1971).
63 Friedrich, Introduction to H. Spiro, supra note 46, at vii. Fogarty similarly demonstrates how co-determination reflects more than 100 years of German experience. See
M. Fogarty, supra note 4, at 60-153.
64 See note 5 supra.
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British nationalized industries have sought to avoid this problem by requiring primary loyalty to the corporation. Labor directors added to the
boards of nationalized firms have been required to resign all formal affiliation with the trade union movement. The labor directors come to the
board as persons with a trade union perspective, but not as representatives
of the trade union movement. 65 The same pattern has occurred in Norway,
at least prior to the new statute. 66
If, however, the "special interest" director comes not simply as a person
with a labor perspective but as a "representative," the problem of conflict
seems inevitable so long as there is no corresponding change in the objectives of the enterprise.
This would be the result if isolated "special interest" representatives were
added to the boards of American corporations as presently constituted. On
the other hand, if the concept of "special interest" representation were accompanied by a broadening of the objectives of the corporation, and the
advancement of shareholder interests were no longer the primary goal, the
premise of undivided loyalty to shareholders would disappear. The question
would then arise whether the loyalty of the "special interest" director to
the interest group that designated him was inconsistent with the new objectives set for the enterprise.
Thus, it would appear that in the end, "special interest" representation
accompanied by restatement of the goals of the corporation would require
the fashioning of new fiduciary standards for directors to reflect the changed
composition of the board and the revised objectives of the corporation. Such
standards would almost inevitably involve the realization that, except in
the most unusual circumstances, "special interest" representatives would
place loyalty to the group which designated them and which they represent
above all other loyalties: whether to the enterprise as a whole, the community, or perhaps even the nation.
The board would then function essentially as a political institution.
There is a serious question whether such a board could effectively function
in the face of the pressures on the individual board members to advance
the interests of the groups that they represent.61 In France, the tripartite
structure of nationalized corporations with government, employee and consumer directors has been strongly criticized as resulting "in a constant
tug-of-war between the different representatives and interests instead of
68
providing a balanced administration in the public interest."
C. Effectiveness of the "Special Interest" Director
Without regard to the troubling question of loyalties, the imposition of
a minority number of "special interest" directors upon an unwilling board
65 See Drake, supra note 58, at 39; M. Fogarty, A Companies Act 1970? 75 (P.E.P. No.
500, Oct. 1967); W. Robson, Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership 217 (1960);
A. Sturmthal, Workers Councils 56-57 (1964).
66 See F. Emery & E. Thorsrud, supra note 7, at 73.
67 See Jacoby, Who Should Be on the Board?, Center Magazine, Jan.-Feb. 1972, at 73, 74.
68 Friedmann, supra note 43, at 315.
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may accomplish little. The hostility of the majority of the board may remove much of the significance of the development. If decisions are made in
caucus prior to a board meeting-reducing the meeting to an empty formality--or if there is an inadequate flow of information, or if there is limited
cooperation from management, then the "special interest" director will not
be able to function effectively. This is illustrated by the German experience
with partial co-determination. Minority representation has built-in limitations. Recent proposals that "public" directors receive corporate funds to
support an independent staff of their own would provide a partial answer.
There is, however, still a serious question whether support from the board
as a whole is not essential for effective functioning of any director.
D. Adequacy of Representation
A fundamental problem of "special interest" representation is the difficulty of assuring adequacy of representation of all groups on the board.
Even if such a difficult objective were somehow achieved with recognition
for all interests in appropriate degrees, the further problem arises whether
a board so selected could in fact manage. The board would have become a
microcosm of the community. Disputes would appear inevitable and the
ability to resolve them doubtful. Further, board decisions would involve
shifting alliances between the constituent groups, "log-rolling" where groups
exchange support for reciprocal advancement of their respective proposals,
and would lead to a condition aptly described as "gangsterism" by Beardsley
Ruml decades ago. 69 The board becomes the battleground for competing
interests.
This discussion is all highly theoretical. As a practical matter there is
limited experience with any type of "special interest" representation other
than the European experience with employee representation. It is desirable
therefore to review separately the particular problems presented by the proposal for employee directors.
IX.

PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY PROPOSALS FOR EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION

Notwithstanding its increasing acceptance abroad, proposals for employee representation present serious problems.
A.

Lack of Trade Union Support
The fundamental difficulty is that the proposal, at least at the present time,
is a theoretical solution to problems of American industrial organization advanced by intellectuals lacking affiliation with the persons whose interests
they seek to advance.
The cold fact of the matter is that, notwithstanding the ferment in this
area abroad, American unions and workers are simply uninterested in the
proposal for board representation. Further, as Professor Dahl points out,
69 Ruml, Corporate Management as a Locus of Power, in Social Meaning of Legal
Coficepts No. 3: The Powers and Duties of Corporate Management 234 (1950).

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"workers and trade unions may be the greatest barriers at present to any
profound reconstruction of economic enterprise in this country." 70 Until
such attitudes change, consideration of the advantages and problems involved in such a proposal should be regarded as an educational exercise,
not without interest or possible usefulness, but completely separated from
political realities.
In at least three instances, however, American trade unions have expressed
some interest in worker representation on the board.
Pilots of United Air Lines sought board representation at the 1972 annual
meeting. The stated objective for such representation was to improve channels of communication, rather than participation in decision-making. The
pilots' proposal received only five percent of the vote. It is perhaps not without significance that this example of an effort for board representation involved a union of elite personnel, earning in some cases more than $50,000
per year. It is hard to view such a development as involving the aspirations
of the average worker. Further, the proposal received no support from the
71
national Airline Pilots Association.
In early 1973, two further developments occurred. As a part of what The
Wall Street Journal described as a "precedent-shattering labor agreement,"
the Providence & Worcester Railroad agreed to a labor representative on its
board of directors. The agreement, however, covers only twenty workers and
its significance is limited.72 The United Rubber Workers recently proposed that General Tire & Rubber Company appoint a union member to
the board of directors but the company stated that it was unlikely it would
78
agree to the proposal.
To the extent that the proposal for employee representation is intended
as a method of increasing union power, it may fairly be asked whether such
representation is required to enable the major unions to deal on equal terms
with the major industries, whether such representation would advance the
interests of any group other than the workers directly affected, and whether
employee directors are any more likely than other directors to be concerned
with the impact of the corporation's operations on the consumer, on the
community, on the environment, or indeed, on other workers 'generally.
B.

Illusory Nature of the Proposal

A serious question is the extent to which the board of directors actually
determines corporate policy and supervises the management of the enterprise
or the extent to which the board is the prisoner of senior management or the
chief executive officer. 74 Dramatic developments such as the Penn Central
debacle illustrate the limitations on the exercise of corporate sovereignty by
Dahi, Power to the Workers?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Nov. 19, 1970, at 20, 22.
See UAL, Inc., Notice of Meeting and Proxy Statement, Mar. 24, 1972, at 2-3, 13-14;
Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1971, at 25, col. 5; id., Apr. 28, 1972, at 34, col. 1.
72 Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1973, at 8, col. 2.
73 N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
74 See M. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality 125-27 (1971).
70
71
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the board.7 5 If the corporate bureaucracy or technostructure ultimately exercises corporate power, board representation may be much less meaningful
than anticipated. Although the problem of management control over the
board by its power of designation is not present in employee representation,
numerous other difficulties-control over the availability of information,
the problem of identifying and understanding the fundamental problems
facing the enterprise, the problem of part time directors endeavoring to
supervise full-time corporate management-still remain.
Even if one somehow solves the foregoing difficulties, employee representation is apt to be illusory unless it involves at least equal power on the board.
The German experience, which at least in this aspect may properly be applied to the American scene, strongly indicates, as noted above, 76 that
minority membership-even one-third membership-accomplishes little for
employees. The minority directors are not accepted by the majority of the
board. The real decisions are often made in separate caucus prior to the
scheduled board meeting which then becomes a formality.
C.

Impairment of Board Operations

It may well be questioned whether the advantages of employee representation outweigh the disharmony and lack of unity which it may bring to the
board. Conflict on the board makes effective functioning difficult. It constitutes a serious distraction from consideration of corporate problems. It
makes participation on the board a thoroughly unpleasant experience.
Where such conflicts have arisen among competing stockholder groups,
independent directors have often demonstrated an unwillingness to be "in
the middle" and have frequently resigned. No doubt, the same pressures
would operate where the disharmony arose from the participation of employee representatives. Further, board unity has seemed to a number of
students of industrial organization to be an important element in the successful conduct of -the company. The board must pull together or it cannot
77
govern effectively.
There have been suggestions in the literature pertaining to the European
experience that the usefulness of employee representation is limited by the
shortage of qualified employee candidates.78 It is difficult to take this objection seriously as applied to the American scene. If necessary, employee
representatives need not be employees or workers. Trade union officers in a
number of cases have been former union lawyers or economists, 79 and there
is no reason why employee board representatives could not also include
union personnel with professional backgrounds.
See Loving, Penn Central Bankruptcy Express, Fortune, Aug. 1970, at 104.
See text accompanying note 49 supra.
77 See G. Goyder, The Future of Private Enterprise 91 (1951).
78 See C. DeHoghton, supra note 46, at 205-06; W. Puckey, supra note 20, at 96.
79 E.g., Murray Finley and Jacob Sheinkman, respectively, General President and General Secretary Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing Workers (lawyers); Ralph Helstein,
President, United Packinghouse Workers (lawyer).
75
76
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D.

Wisdom of the Proposal

A fundamental objection may be made to the wisdom of the proposal.
What is the objective? Is it to advance the interests of the firm's employees
as the group most profoundly affected by the enterprise? Is it to advance the
interests of employees generally in the society?
It is clear that board representation introduces a measure of countervailing power in the highest levels of the corporation that will strengthen the
position of employees versus the management. As noted previously, many
trade unions, particularly in England and Ireland, have not always been
convinced that this is in fact the case, and have concluded, at least in the
past, that union power would be compromised and weakened by representation on the board. In contrast, the German and Swedish unions have
firmly embraced the principle. Employee representation regarded in this
light merely becomes a new chapter in labor relations, although on a grand
scale. The values involved relate to the relative positions of labor and management in the society and the social desirability of further strengthening
union power. It also presents the question of the appropriateness of
achieving such an objective through the device of restructuring the corporate organization rather than in some other manner, such as the collective
bargaining process.
If employee representation on the board is regarded as a method of advancing the interest of workers as a whole, not merely those employed by the
corporation, the German and the Yugoslav experience would both appear to
demonstrate that it is unlikely that any such objective will be achieved.
Worker power on the board is reflected, if at all, in improved conditions for
workers in the individual corporation. It does not appear to be concerned
with the aspirations and problems of workers elsewhere in the country.
"Plant egotism" is the apt expression used to describe this self-centered
viewpoint.S0
If this is the case, it is even more questionable to expect that employee
representation will advance the interest of the public as a whole. After all, it
is "special interest," not "public interest," representation that is being proposed.
There is a further consideration. Employee representation transfers to
the board level the struggle between the competing interests. It is far from
clear that it is desirable to have labor negotiations conducted in the board
room. In view of the significant impact that the ultimate terms of the labor
bargain have on the society as a whole, there are major advantages in
having the conflict conducted more in the open where public scrutiny is possible and public attitudes may influence the result.
X.

REFORM PROPOSALS AND CHANGES IN BOARD STRUCTURE

From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that some of the problems
presented by proposals for special interest representation on the board of
SO See H. Spiro, supra note 46, at 145-46; Vagts, supra note 31, at 73.
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directors arise because of the unitary board system with which we are
familiar. Where the board of directors "manages the business and affairs of
the corporation," in the familiar statutory language,"' introduction of
"special interest" representatives into the senior management decision-making machinery presents difficulties. The question arises whether a change in
the structure of the board may sidestep some of these problems.
A.

The "Dual Board" Model

It perhaps is no accident that co-determination has arisen in Germany
and has been adopted in the European Company Draft Statute as part of a
corporate structure that involves a dual board. Under the German system,
faithfully followed in the European Company Draft Statute, employees are
represented only on the upper or Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board
has important, but limited, functions. It does not manage. It does not set
policy. It is not concerned with day-to-day operations. Its major roles are
twofold. It elects the members of the lower or Managing Board. It receives
reports from the Managing Board and it supervises. The Managing Board,
which conducts the business of the corporation, does not include employee
representatives although, as we have seen 82 under full co-determination in
the coal, iron and steel industries, selection of the Labor Director on the
Managing Board is subject to the veto of the employee representatives
on the Supervisory Board.
The insulation of the employee directors from the conduct of the business
and the determination of business policy significantly reduces the problems
of lack of harmony or unity that would arise in the unitary American or
English board. Furthermore, as a political matter, it would evidently make
the introduction of employee representation more acceptable to management and shareholders.
B.

Incipient Moves in the United States Toward the Dual Board Structure

There do not appear to have been any formal efforts to introduce the dual
board structure into the United States. Nevertheless, some movement in this
direction has occurred on the practical level. A number of major corporations have sought to reorganize senior management through the creation of
a collegium of officials at the highest level. Thus, organization of the Office
of the Chairman or the Office of the President, which includes not only the
officer in question but a limited number of directors, working full time and
without other duties or titles, may fairly be regarded as the establishment of
a new dual structure, not without some resemblance to the German Managing Board. Such a system is already in effect in a number of major Ameri83
can corporations.
Perhaps, the growing influence of executive committees points in the same
81 E.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 35 (1969); Del. Corp. Law § 141 (1972); N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
82 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
83 E.g., Texas Instruments Inc., 1971 Annual Report (back cover).
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direction. In those cases where there is an active executive committee meeting monthly or more frequently and a relatively inactive board meeting
quarterly and confining its action to ratification of the acts of the executive
committee, a functional change of significance has taken place. In such cases
as well, there is a resemblance to the dual board system.
One should not, however, make too much of the development of the Office
of the Chairman or the Office of the President. It is still in the formative
stages, and its ultimate significance is not clear. One cannot, however, dismiss the possibility that it might in time lead in practice to some variation
of the dual board system.
XI.

PROSPECTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF REFORM

There is no indication at the present time that radical change in the
American corporate structure to embrace employee or other "special interest" representation in the senior councils of the corporation-whether in
a single or dual board system-is apt to become a serious possibility in the
near future. Until the proposal for employee representation is adopted and
vigorously pursued by American trade unions, it is purely an academic suggestion. Further, there is the inescapable fact that American trade unions
do not represent American employees as a whole. Out of a total labor force
of 85 million,8 4 only 20 million are union members.80
Nevertheless, there are powerful factors at work at fundamental levels that
in time could make the possibility of employee representation, in particular,
a challenging reality. Accordingly, the possibility of such a development
cannot be dismissed.
A.

Changing Attitudes of Employees

It is clear that the fundamental relation of the employee to the employer
is undergoing change. The attitudes of employees toward work are a matter
of increasing concern. Job alienation, increased absenteeism, increased labor
turnover, declining productivity, resistance to dull and repetitive work
assignments, weak morale and hostility toward the production line are
familiar features of the current scene and have made business aware of the
importance of increasing job satisfaction. 8 Lordstown is today a part of the
vocabulary.87
Human fulfillment through participation in decision-making has been
recognized as one of the most effective methods of dealing with the problem
of worker alienation. Enfranchisement and involvement in job organization, work allocation and production have become established techniques
for labor participation. The pressures that make for such participation at
84 Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 216 (1972).
85 Id. 241.
86 Work in America (Report to Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973);
Wool, What's Wrong with Work in America?, Monthly Labor Review, Mar. 1973;
Bus. Week, Sept. 9, 1972, at 79, 108 (Special Issue on Productivity); id., Mar. 4, 1972,
at 69; Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 6; id., Sept. 12, 1972, at 12, col. 3.
87 See Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
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the grass roots level may conceivably over the long pull make for representation on the board level as well.
Added to this underlying dissatisfaction with work is the growing
phenomenon of employee dissent. Illustrations of the current ferment are:
the emergence of "underground" employee newspapers highly critical of
employer policies; 88 leafletting on company premises;8 9 boycotts by employees protesting company attitudes;9 0 the phenomenon of "whistle blowing"-unauthorized disclosure by an employee of company conduct deemed
socially undesirable.91 Employer-employee relationships are obviously being
affected by the profound and accelerating change in society itself. The
magnitude in the degree of change of values, of attitudes, of so-called
consciousness may conceivably create a social and political climate in which
employee representation on the board-entirely visionary at the present time
-may become a realistic possibility in the future.
The foregoing factors will undoubtedly strengthen a movement toward
greater job participation and employer-employee interaction on the grass
roots level. Such a movement may well mean greater employee participation
in the decision-making process at the lower levels of management. This may,
in turn, ultimately lead to pressure for employee representation at the board
level. A number of students of worker participation have, however, concluded that board representation may be distinctly less useful and important
in achieving the values that flow from worker participation than opportunities on the plant level would be. 92
These elements may also emerge as a part of the political scene if there is
any important development of a populist political movement. Political
challenge to the large corporation will almost inevitably include, among
other things, proposals for the introduction of employees into the senior
decision-making processes of the corporation.9 8
B.

Federal Incorporation
The development of interest in federal incorporation of major corpora-

88 Bus. Week, Oct. 9, 1971, at 86; Bus. & Soc'y, Sept. 5, 1972, at 2; Wall St. J., Nov. 3,
1971, at 16, col. 2.
89 Corporate Information Center, Corporate Examiner, Sept. 1972, at 5 (2,000 anti-U.S.

Savings Bonds leaflets distributed as an antiwar demonstration at Bell Laboratories,
Holmdel, N.J.).
90 N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1971, at 12, col. I (Polaroid chemist, leader of Polaroid

Revolutionary Workers Movement, dismissed for organizing a boycott of Polaroid products
to protest its business in South Africa).
91 See R. Nader, P. Petkas & K. Blackwell, Whistle Blowing (1972); Blumberg, Corporate
Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 279 (1971), reprinted in Corporate Counsel's Annual-1972, at 3;
Nader, A Code for Professional Responsibility, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1971, at 43, col. 3.
See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1971, at 32, col. 6; id., Mar. 21, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 16,
col. 5; Branch, Courage Without Esteem: Profiles in Whistle Blowing, Washington
Monthly, May 1971, at 23.
92 See Paul Blumberg, supra note 7, at 2-3; F. Emery & E. Thorsrud, supra note 7, at
10.
93 See J. Newfield & J. Greenfield, A Populist Manifesto 173 (1972).
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tions94 may create the stage for consideration of employee representation on
the board. The increasing abdication by the various states of control over
the internal conduct of corporate affairs and the increased concern with the
role of the large corporation in society make enactment of a federal incorporation statute within the next 15 years a realistic possibility.95
The substantive content of any such statute is an open question. It is a
question of which we have little glimpse as to what may be expected. It is
dear, however, that consideration of such a fundamental departure as a
federal incorporation statute would inevitably involve a basic review of
possible areas of corporate reform. Consideration of employee representation on the board, or of public or government directors, would find priority
places on any such agenda.
C.

Impact of the European Experience

A third fundamental factor is the strength of the movement for employee
directors outside of the United States. The world is increasingly becoming
smaller and the experiences of other nations increasingly significant at
home. The widespread European acceptance of employee representation on
the board will unmistakably have impact on American business attitudes.
In addition, the multinational experience of many large American
corporations has profound implications. First-hand experience with the
reality of employee representation can only increase understanding of the
proposal and reduce resistance to it. A business that operates its foreign subsidiaries successfully notwithstanding employees on the foreign subsidiaries'
boards cannot contend as successfully that such representation produces
unworkable results.
Recognition of the dual board structure and employee representation
will clearly receive further impetus in the event the Common Market adopts
the European Company Draft Statute, which includes these concepts.
Further, British entry into the Common Market will mean that the
principles of partial co-determination and of the dual board embodied in
the European Company Draft Statute, if enacted, may be expected to spread
to Great Britain. This will accelerate the educational process by which
American business becomes more familiar with the concept of employee
representation. British law and institutions exert considerable influence on
American thought. If partial co-determination crosses the Channel to Great
Britain, the chances of its jumping the Atlantic are considerably increased. 96
94 See Flynn, Corporate Democracy-Who Needs It? (Address, Conference on Corporate
Accountability, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 30, 1971); Nader, The Case for Federal Incorporation (Address, Conference on Corporate Accountability, in Washington, D.C.,
Oct. 80, 1971); Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 Geo.
L.J. 71 (1972); N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
95 However, Senator Hart, who favors federal incorporation, informed a Georgetown
Law Center seminar in February 1972 that "my most optimistic guess is that we might
get six votes right now in the whole Senate." Statement from office of Sen. Hart for
release Feb. 3, 1972.
96 See Vagts, The European System, 27 Bus. Law. 165, 168 (Special Issue, Feb. 1972).
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Finally, the objective of the extension of full co-determination, or one-half
membership on the Supervisory Board, from coal, iron and steel to German
industry generally has been firmly embraced by the German trade union
movement and by the Social Democratic Party. If accepted in Germany, the
reverberations will clearly have a wide range of influence.
XII.

CONCLUSION'

Special interest representation in general and employee representation in
particular are presently no more than topics for academic discussion in the
United States. Nevertheless, there are deep-seated underlying forces that
could conceivably make proposals of this nature, particularly for employee
representation, a matter of realistic and practical concern in the future.9 7
97 See Shonfield, Business in the Twenty-First Century, Daedalus, Winter 1969, at 202-03.

